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Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence:
How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay
Investigation
Aziz Z. Huqt and Richard H. McAdamstt

ABSTRACT

Under state law, municipal codes, and collective bargaining
agreements, police officers in many jurisdictions benefit from a set of
heightened procedural protections. These frequently include provisions
restricting the timing and manner by which investigators interview or
interrogate police, which we call "interrogation buffers." One specific
buffer is a mandatory period of delay between a use-of-force incident
and ensuing investigation or interrogation. Such "delay privileges" have
the predictable effect of obstructing investigations, diminishing the
likelihood that culpable officers are subject to effective internal
investigation, and correspondingly increasing the probability that
officers disposed to use excessive force will continue to work the streets
without reprimand or supplemental supervision. This Article
demonstrates that federal constitutional tort law and state contract

law-respectively, municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
public policy doctrine of contract invalidity-can be leveraged to
improve the efficacy of post-incident investigations by challenging delay
privileges. Although such suits will not always succeed, there are
powerful reasons to use them to raise the fiscal and reputationalcost of
maintaining a widespread policing practice that serves largely to
promote unlawful police violence.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 19, 2015, a University of Cincinnati police officer named
Ray Tensing shot and killed an unarmed African American motorist
called Samuel Dubose.' Explaining his decision to use deadly force,
Tensing reported "being dragged by [Dubose's] vehicle and [having] to
2
fire his weapon," an account corroborated by at least one other officer.
Tensing, however, was wearing a body camera that documented a
different set of events. As the camera showed, Dubose neither
threatened nor harmed the officer. No one was dragged by his car. 3
Eleven days after the shooting, the Hamilton County prosecutor
indicted Tensing on murder charges, explaining that Tensing's initial
account had been fabricated. 4 The officer who corroborated Tensing's
5
false account was not indicted; he apparently remains on active duty.
The Dubose shooting is exemplary of recent instances in which video
evidence reveals a schism between officers' ex post reports of how force
was employed, and the events in question.6 In particular, the Dubose
case is illustrative insofar as it involved concurring false exculpatory
testimony from plural officers. 7
Officers do not always shield their colleagues. In other instances,
officers witnessing their colleagues' use of excessive force choose to
become whistleblowers. In 2012, for example, a young Baltimore
detective named Joe Crystal reported on two officers who he witnessed
assault a drug suspect. As Crystal recounts the story, the beating was
1 Richard P6rez-Pefia, University of CincinnatiOfficer Indicted in Shooting Death of Samuel
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/us/
2015),
29,
(July
TIMES
N.Y.
Dubose,
university-of-cincinnati-officer-indicted-in-shooting-death-of-motorist.html [https://perma.cc/V96JGAZD].
2 Id.
3
4

Id.
id.

Elisha Fieldstadt, Samuel Dubose Shooting: No Charges for Two Officers Who Responded,
NBC NEWS (July 31, 2015), http: llwww.nbcnews.cominews/us-news/cincinnati-traffic-stopshooting-no-charges-two-officers-who-responded-n40197 1 [https://perma.cc/Q2Z5-5QV4].
6 See, e.g., Ty Burr, In the Video of Sandra Bland's Arrest, the Tape Doesn't Lie, BOSTON
GLOBE (July 23, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/2015/07/23/video-bland-arrest-tapedoesn-lie/fqhkLb94dREEcjTNb4EcxM/story.html [https://perma.ce/CFC7-25GX] (noting "flagrant
contradiction" between the video of an arrest and the officer's subsequent account); Michael S.
Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-chargedwith-murder-in-black-mans-death.html [https://perma.cc/8Y95-RUGT]. The problem is hardly a
new one. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, 2 Boston Police Officers Charged with Lying in Killing of
Officer, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/16/us/2-boston-police-officerscharged-with-lying-in-killing-of-officer.html [https://perma.cc/45GH-KMNF].
See, e.g., Mike Lowe, Four Police Officers Charged with Perjury in Glenview Drug Case,
WGN-TV (June 8, 2015), http://wgntv.com/2015/06/08/four-police-officers-charged-with-perjury-inglenview-drug-case/ [https://perma.cc/KN6Q-QKTK].
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particularly deliberate and gratuitous.8 The suspect had attempted to
flee by kicking in the door of a random row house apartment and
running inside. The two officers removed the suspect, placed him in
their vehicle, and drove away. They then apparently received a call
from a fourth Baltimore police officer, Anthony Williams, who
communicated that his girlfriend lived in the apartment into which the
suspect had intruded. Crystal said he had observed the two arresting
officers drive back to the scene and take the suspect back into the same
apartment. When Officer Williams arrived, he beat the suspect. Despite
being warned by his Sergeant not to report these events, Crystal
approached the State's Attorney. As a result, Crystal recounts, he
became a target for taunts and harassment while on the job. His peer
officers repeatedly failed to respond to his calls for backup; he received
threats of perjury prosecution in the criminal matter that his
whistleblowing prompted; and a dead rat was left on his vehicle's
windshield. 9 Prior to the beating incident, Crystal had been
commended for his leadership and promoted quickly. After two years'
retaliation for whistleblowing, he resigned from the force.10
A more complex and compelling example of both police cover-up
and whistleblowing occurred in Chicago, in what subsequently became
a nationally famous police shooting. On October 20, 2014, a Chicago
Police Department officer shot and killed a seventeen-year-old African
American named Laquan McDonald." Speaking to media at the scene

See Colin Campbell, Batts Defends Officer Who Claims He Was Intimidated for Testifying,
BALT.

SUN

(Feb.

27,

2014),

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-ci-

police-support-crystal-coming-forward-20140227-story.html
[https:Iperma.cc/6DFK-WSRF]; Ian
Duncan, Officer Found Rat on Car After Assisting Probe of Colleagues, BALT. SUN
(Feb. 19, 2014), http: Ilwww.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-ci-officer-witnessretaliation-20140219-story.html [http://perma.cc/CYQ6-A3QQ]; Ed Krayewski, Ex-Baltimore Cop
Alleges Retaliation for Reporting Police Brutality, REASON (Dec. 26, 2014), https:I#reason.com/
blog/20 14/12/26/ex-baltimore-cop-alleges-retaliation-for [https://perma.cclY4VB-L5K4].
'

Sebastian Murdock, 'Rat Cop' Shunned from Baltimore Police Department After Reporting

Police Brutality, HUFFINGTON POST, (June 16, 2015), http:I/www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/16/
baltimore-joe-crystal-n 7582374.html [https://perma.cc/L3Z5-Q76M].
'0

He has subsequently sued the police force. See Edward Ericson Jr., Whistleblower Cop

Joseph Crystal Recalls His Battles with Baltimore's Blue Wall of Silence, CITY PAPER (Jan. 20,
2015),

http:I/www.citypaper.com/news/mobtownbeat/bcp-whistleblower-cop-joseph-crystal-recalls-

his-battles-with-the-baltimore-police-departments-blue-wall-20150 120-story.html [https://perma.
cc/AV2T-C8YA]; Krayewski, supra note 8. Officer Williams was ultimately convicted of assault
and hindering an investigation and, after saying that he did nothing wrong and would change
nothing he did that day, received a sentence of forty-five days. Jayne Miller, Baltimore Officer
Sentenced in Drug Suspect's Assault: Officer Anthony Williams Gets 45 Days in Jail for Assaulting
Man,

WBAL-TV

(Apr.

17,

2014),

http:I/www.wbaltv.com/news/baltimore-officer-connected-to-

witness-intimidation-case-sentenced/25514064 [https:Iperma.cc/F469-ZZ2E]. The other officer,
Sgt. Marinos Gialamas, was convicted and sentenced to probation. See Ericson, supranote 10.
" No Bail for Chicago Officer Jason Van Dyke, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2015/11/24/us/video-chicago-laquan-mcdonald-jason-van-dyke-shooting.html
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of the shooting, former Fraternal Order of Police spokesman Pat
Camden explained that "[t]he boy lunged at police, and one of the
officers opened fire."' 2 Five officers, including the officer who
discharged his firearm, gave statements consistent with this account.13
The next day, the local media offered a brief report on the case, based
largely on the description of a police spokesman, who said that
McDonald had been slashing tires with a knife, ignored police requests
to drop the knife, and approached or "lunged" at officers putting them
in fear for their life.1 4 The report also said simply that an officer shot
McDonald in the chest and he was pronounced dead at the hospital. A
"preliminary statement" from the police reiterated that McDonald
"continued to approach the officers[,]" and that "the officer discharged
his weapon, striking the offender."' 5 So described, the shooting seemed
justified-just one of the many deadly uses of force by Chicago police
each year.16
Yet in December of 2014, our colleague Craig Futterman, along
with Jamie Kalven of the Invisible Institute, announced the existence
of police dashboard video of the shooting, which they said would put the
events in a different light. They also claimed to have found a civilian
witness who said that other such witnesses were "shooed away" from
the scene without having their statements taken.' 7 In February 2015,
Kalven obtained the autopsy report, which showed that McDonald had
been shot sixteen times-a fact difficult to square with a simple claim

[https://perma.cc/JE2H-UU2X].
1
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING TRUST
BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 2 (Apr. 2016),

/

[https:
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATFFinal-Report_4_13_16-1.pdf
perma.cc/4SLF-MV4K] [hereinafter Task Force Report].
13 Id. at 2-3.
14 Marissa
Bailey, Police Shoot, Kill Knife-Wielding Teen on South Side, CBS CHI.
(Oct. 21, 2014), http: //chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/10/2 1/police-shoot-kill-knife-wielding-teen-onsouth-side/ [https//perma.cc/VT6C-B7BU]; Quinn Ford, Cops: Boy, 17, Fatally Shot by Officer After
Refusing to Drop Knife, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/locall
[https://perma.cclSRF4-A9ZZ]
breaking/chi-chicago-shootings-violence-20141021-story.html
(including references to the report from police spokesman Pat Camden); Teen Shot, Killed by
21,
2014),
NBC
CHICAGO
(Oct.
Chicago's Southwest Side,
Police Officer on
3
62
.html#ixzz
http: /www.nbcchicago.com/news/Iocal/chicago-shooting-4100-south-karlov-2798845
sihriX2S [https://perma.cc/6NRU-MCTN].
" Jason Meisner & Jeremy Gorner, Cop Who Shot Teen 16 Times Has History of Citizen
Complaints, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2015), http:Ilwww.chicagotribune.comnews/ct-police-shooting-16shots-04--met-20150425-story.html#nt=related-content [https://perma.cc/F3FF-Z9YP].
1
According to Craig Futterman, Chicago police officers shoot about fifty civilians per year.
See Curtis Black, How Chicago Tried to Cover Up a Police Execution, CHI. REP. (Nov. 24, 2015),
http: //chicagoreporter.com/how-chicago-tried-to-cover-up-a-police-execution/
[https: //perma.cc/B7YM-2TBH].
17

Id.
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of self-defense.1 8 In March, the City approved a payment of $5 million
to the McDonald family to settle legal claims, even though the
McDonalds had filed no suit.19 In April, the Chicago Tribune revealed
the shooter's identity, Officer Jason Van Dyke, and the fact that he had
previously been the target of seventeen citizen complaints since 2006,
several for the use of excessive force, including one that resulted in a
jury award of $350,000.20 In May, local news reported that the manager
of a Burger King franchise in the vicinity of the shooting said that,
immediately after the shooting, police officers sought access to, and
deleted, video from multiple security cameras for the time period
around the shooting. 21 Finally, journalist Brandon Smith won a state
Freedom of Information Act request for the video and a state court
ordered its release in November 2015.22
That video did not show McDonald "lunging" towards the officers,
nor even approaching them, but walking in a direction angled away,
with the knife down by his side in the hand farthest from the officers.
Squad cars blocked McDonald's possible exits. No civilians were within
his reach. Van Dyke had recently exited his squad car and taken a step
towards McDonald when he opened fire. The first shot hit McDonald,
who "immediately" fell to the ground. 23 Van Dyke then unloaded his
clip, firing a total of sixteen bullets into McDonald's body. 24
Immediately before the video's release, the State's Attorney announced
that she was charging Van Dyke with murder. 25
The response to McDonald's shooting illustrates what Chicago
mayor Rahm Emmanuel has called a powerful "code of silence" among
the Chicago Police Department. 26 The many officers present at the

18

Id.

19
20

Id.
Meisner & Gorner, supra note
15.
See Carol Marin & Don Moseley, Missing Minutes from Security Video Raises
Questions,
CHI.
(May
26,
2015),
http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/laquan-mcdonald-

21

NBC

investigation-30510563 1.html [https://perma.ccl9EHV-DABW].
22

See Jeremy Borden, How a Little-known, Uber-drivingFreelancerBrought the Lawsuit that

Forced Chicago to Release a Police Shooting Video, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.cjr.org/united-states-project/brandon-smith-chicago-police-laquan-mcdonald.php

[https://perma.cc/GS4H-CXB7].
23

Task Force Report, supra note 12, at 2.

24

Id.

Jason Meisner et al., Chicago Releases Dash-cam Video of Fatal Shooting After Cop
Charged with Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2015), http:I/www.chicagotribune.com/news/locall
breaking/ct-chicago-cop-shooting-video-laquan-mcdonald-charges-2015 1124-story.html
[http://perma.cc/3WNG-CT7N].
26 Rahm Decries Police 'Code Of Silence' Ahead Of Morning Speech to City Council,
CHICAGOIST (Dec. 9, 2015), http://chicagoist.com/2015/12/09/rahm gives-preview-of-city-council.
php [https://perma.cc/89G9-KGKN].
2
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scene publicly acquiesced in the official, false narrative, one that made
the shooting seem a straightforward case of self-defense. Others
apparently instructed witnesses to leave the area without taking their
statement. Apparently, at least one officer deleted Burger King
surveillance videos of the incident. But for the actions of Futterman,
Kalven, and Smith, the case might have faded away without criminal,
civil, or even professional repercussions for Officer Van Dyke. 27 And yet
despite the police cover-up, there was also a whistleblower. Kalven and
Futterman first asked for an autopsy only because a whistleblower
alerted them to the existence of a dashcam video showing "horrific"
events. 28 The whistleblower remains anonymous. But it is reasonable to
assume it was a police officer who wanted accountability for an
unjustified killing, but who did not want to suffer Officer Crystal's fate.
It is not possible to ascertain precisely how often events of the sort
depicted in these anecdotes occur. We are discovering more incidents in
which officers who have used force against citizens are caught in
misrepresentations exposed by dashboard or body cameras.
Misrepresentations in police reports are akin to the courtroom
misrepresentations academic literature labels as "testilying."29 A tally
of criminal prosecutions or convictions would yield a substantial
undercount. Prosecutors are normally reluctant to bring charges
against members of the police force, which is, after all, a cooperating
state agency's personnel. 30 And jurors may often be unwilling to
disbelieve officers. 31 Civil actions do not supply a reliable count either,
because we do not know what fraction of unlawful force cases produce
litigation. Despite the absence of reliable statistics, there is evidence
that the rate of improper police uses of force is, by any measure, high.
For example, a 2002 Bureau of Justice national survey estimated that
27
State's Attorney Anita Alvarez claimed that her investigation was proceeding without
regard to the public pressure or the video's disclosure. There was also an FBI investigation. So it is
difficult to know what would have happened without the pressure brought by Kalven, Futterman,
and Smith. But we think one does not have to be too jaded to think that political will to proceed
would have been missing absent their efforts.
2 See Black, supranote 16.
29
MILTON MOLLEN ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T 36 (July 7, 1994). This

term has generated extensive scholarly commentary. See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C.
Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police
Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998); Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying," and the Constitution,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do
About It, 67, U. COL. L. REV. 1037 (1996). The misrepresentation we are concerned with here,
however, does not necessarily occur under oath.

0 See Chin & Wells, supra note 29, at 261-64.
a1 See Allison Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in
DeterringPolice Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 754 (1993).
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police used force against individuals on 664,460 instances annually,
and that approximately 587,000 of those usages were perceived as
excessive. 32 The gap between the perceived incidence of inappropriate
force and the exceedingly low rates of discipline raises an obvious
question of whether officers always truthfully report use-of-force events
to superiors and internal investigators.33 Contemporary examples and
history give reason to think not. In its final report on corruption and
abuse in New York City police, for example, the 1994 Mollen
Commission found that "perjury and falsifications are serious problems
in law enforcement that, though not condoned, are ignored." 34 We think
this likely remains so.
Police officers' tendency to use unlawful or unconstitutional force is
a practice embedded within a complex assemblage of institutional
practices, including cultural norms within police departments, state,
and federal employment regulation (including due process protections
for state employees), and constitutional rules. 35 No one reform or rule

32

Matthew R. Durose et al., Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2005, BUREAU OF JUST.

STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 8 (Apr. 2007), http:I/www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf
[https:I/perma.cc/32ED-B2GF]. The number of police-caused fatalities is subject to considerable
dispute, but the best estimates for 2015 puts the figure at greater than 1,000. Jon Swaine & Oliver
Laughland, Number of People Killed by U.S. Police at 1000 After Oakland Shooting, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/16/the-counted-killed-by-police1000 [https://perma.cc/8WZS-SNJR].
* Our home town Chicago, for example, had more fatal shootings by police than any other
American city between 2010 and 2014, but internal investigations found only two of the 409
shootings during that period unjustified. Ben Austen, Chicago After Laquan McDonald, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2016), http: //www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/magazine/chicago-after-laquanmcdonald.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QVP7-G4BC]. Might there be too little police violence? The
argument for this position might be that increasing police activity leads to diminished crime rates,
which on balance are socially beneficial. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell
in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163,

176-77 (2004) (finding that an increased number of officers on the street during the 1990s can
account for 1/5 to 1/10 of the decline in crime during that period). No study of which we are aware,
however, shows that the use of unconstitutional force tends to reduce crime rates. Rather,
empirical studies of even marginally less intrusive measures that are more likely to influence

crime rates-for instance, stop-and-frisk practices-do not support the conclusion that more police
activity (even of a less coercive form) necessarily translates into less crime. See Richard Rosenfeld

& Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New
York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q. 96, 97-98 (2012) (finding no evidence that increased use of stop
and frisk reduced burglary and robbery rates). To the contrary, there is evidence that crime

control goals can be furthered even as the volume of police activity is reduced. See generally David
Weisburd et al., Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New York City Crime Drop
Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength?: The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot
Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129 (2014) (arguing that increased use of "hot spot" policing
during periods of downsizing in the New York City police department led to reductions in crime
rates).
3

MOLLEN ETAL., supra note 29, at 41.

3 See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 763-64 (2012)
(pointing out that legal scholars have "[neglected] the full web of federal, state, and local laws that
govern the police outside of the context of criminal investigations" in analyzing police regulation).
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will likely prove a panacea. Instead, changes in police practice are
likely to emerge from concatenated factors. These likely include shifting
public attitudes toward police and the objects of iterative police
scrutiny; changes in police culture and leadership; and reinvigorated or
reimagined forms of judicial supervision.
Our aim in this Article is to pick out one element of this array of
barriers to reform. Having homed in upon a particular element of police
practices, we examine how federal and state tort and contract lawmore specifically, municipal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the state public policy doctrine of contract invalidity-might be
leveraged to improve the efficacy of post-incident investigations, and
thereby reduce the rate at which excessive force is used. We focus on
one quite specific element of the law. Pursuant to state law or to a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between a police union and a
municipality, individual officers often benefit from provisions that
restrict the timing and manner by which investigators interview or
interrogate police, which we call "interrogation buffers." One specific
buffer is a mandatory period of delay between a use-of-force incident
and the ensuing investigation or interrogation, what we call a "delay
privilege." 36 By mandating a delay of either hours or days between the
notice the internal investigator first gives to an officer of the existence
of the investigation and the need for an interview (or sometimes the
occurrence of the incident giving rise to the investigation) and the
obstruct
predictably
provisions
such
interview,
actual first
are
officers
culpable
that
investigations, diminishing the likelihood
subject to effective internal investigation, and correspondingly increase
the probability that officers disposed to use excessive force will continue
to work the streets without reprimand or supplemental supervision.
Because there is reason to believe that a small minority of officers
are responsible for a disproportionate percentage of excessive and
unlawful uses of force-i.e., they are repeat players-interrogation
buffers have the predictable effect of enabling future incidents of
unconstitutional police force. Indeed, part of our argument is that their
sole effect and sole plausible justification is to raise the cost of
identifying and sanctioning violent cops. Delay privileges, as a result,
predictably yield future violations of citizens' constitutional and legal
rights. The core of our argument is that civil litigation in state and
federal court can be employed to challenge at least those delay

In their seminal treatment of the topic, Kevin M. Keenan and Samuel Walker call these
"waiting period" provisions. See Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police
Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 185, 212-14 (2005).
16
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privileges contained in CBAs. These judicial challenges could succeed
at invalidating such provisions. Even if they fall short of that goal, they
would raise popular awareness of the existence and adverse effect of
these provisions, creating political pressure for their elimination. To be
clear, we are under no illusion that the civil suits envisaged here would
single-handedly solve this problem. Our more modest goal is to
illuminate a contribution that ordinary civil law-and those willing to
invoke it-can make.
The two main Parts of the essay advance complementary
descriptive and legal claims. To begin, Part II documents the existence
of interrogation buffers and, specifically, delay privileges under state
law and CBAs, and then scrutinizes their potential normative
justifications-an analysis that flows inexorably into a tally of their
likely consequences. Part III then turns to potential state and federal
law litigation responses available when a delay privilege is contained in
a CBA.
II.

DELAY PRIVILEGES IN LAW AND IN PRACTICE

We start by describing the emergence and content of delay
privileges. We then explore their potential justifications and likely
consequences. We focus our discussion on the relationship of delay
privileges with the unconstitutional or unlawful use of force 37-which
we take as the paradigmatic form of unlawful police action that should
be identified, sanctioned, and stopped.
A.

The Law of Interrogation Buffers and Delay Privileges

Over the past half century, police organizations across the United
States have acquired generous procedural privileges for disciplinary
investigations into the misconduct of individual officers, frequently
under the rubric of a "Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights." These
procedural rules concern civil investigations that can result in
employment sanctions, such as suspension, demotion, or dismissal. 38
Most of these rules specify restraints on interviewing or interrogating
police. Examples include an officer's right to certain information before
any interview; a right to representation by counsel or union official
during the interview; the right to take periodic breaks and limit the
" See infra note 135, for our discussion about the constitutional law of excessive force under
the Fourth Amendment.
8 The procedures do not apply to criminal investigations, as by prosecutors or homicide
detectives, though we note such investigations of police are exceedingly rare. When a criminal
investigation does occur, it frequently begins after a period of delay and is governed by other
constitutional rights.
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interview session to a reasonable time; and the right to limit
questioning to a single interviewer, who must not be "abusive" of the
interviewee for any session. All of these rights serve to create a "buffer"
of protection for the officer, to make the examination less threatening
to the officer's interests. 39
Yet another type of procedural privilege is the primary focus of this
delay. For many police
Article: rules favoring investigative
departments, the applicable state or local law or a CBA mandates a
delay before the interview or interrogation of an officer (as witness or
accused) about an incident that could lead to employment discipline of
that or another officer. Sometimes the delay is "mandatory" because it
does not appear the officer is empowered to waive the period of delay.
In these cases, the procedure specifies how many days must pass after
the incident being investigated or after the investigator provides notice
to the officer of the demand for an interview. Alternatively, sometimes
the applicable law or CBA grants the officer an option of delaying the
interview or interrogation, usually for the purpose of obtaining
representation. Of all interrogation buffers, we focus on delay privileges
because we believe it to be the most socially harmful, the least
40
defensible, and so the most vulnerable to legal attack.
One source of these police privileges is the Law Enforcement
Officers Bill of Rights (LEOBR) codified in a state statute. According to
Kevin Kennan and Samuel Walker's leading historical account,
Maryland and Florida were the first to enact such a statute in 1974.41
By our count, twenty states now have LEOBRs or other statutes that
regulate how administrative investigators can interview or interrogate
police officers (as targets or witnesses) in a disciplinary investigation
into police misconduct 42 such as a police shooting or another potentially

3 Some procedural rights are broader than the issue of interrogation. For example, some
rules prohibit an investigation unless the citizen complaint is sworn to in an affidavit. In this
paper we do not take issue with any of these provisions except for those that grant officers a
privilege of investigatory delay. For a suggestion that procedural rights granted to police should be
a model for the procedural protections of citizen, see Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L.
REV. 1197 (2016).
Another detail we bracket here is the trigger for an internal investigation: If such inquiries
occur only after a citizen complaint is lodged, they will be far less effective than if they occur
automatically whenever force is known to have been used by officers.
41
Keenan & Walker, supra note 36, at 197.
42
See Ar. Code. Ann § 14-52-303(3); Az. Stat. § 38-1104(B) (2); Cal. Gov. Code § 3300-3313; 11
Del. Code § 9200; Fl. Stat. Ann. § 112.532(1); Ill. Comp. Stat. § 725; Iowa Code Ann. § 80F.1(5); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 15.520; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2531; Md. Code, Public Safety § 3-104; Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 626.89; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 289.010-289.120; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-14-4 to 29-14-5; Or. Rev.
Stat. § 236.360; R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6.2; Tn. Code Ann. § 38-8-302; Tx. Local Govt. § 143.123(f);
Va. Code. Ann. § 9.1-500-507; W. Va. Code § 8-14A-2; Wis. Stat. § 164.02.
4

213]

LITIGATING THE BLUE WALL OF SILENCE

223

unlawful use of force. 43 Of the twenty, nine states (Delaware, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, Rhode Island, and
Texas) include a period of delay, ranging from an open-ended
"reasonable time" to a specified amount, ranging from forty-eight hours
to thirty days, to obtain representation. 44
But delay privileges are pervasive beyond these nine states,
although it is difficult to determine their precise scope, which turns on
local law and contracts. In the other forty-one states, many municipal
ordinances provide interrogation buffers, including delay privileges.
Consider New York City's regulation:
A member of the Police Department who is the subject of a
complaint shall be given two business days notice prior to the
date of an interview, to obtain and consult with counsel. A
member of the Police Department who is a witness in an
investigation of a complaint shall be given . . . up to two
business days, to confer with counsel. 45

41

Our discussion focuses on police shootings because this is an important category of state

coercion warranting regulation. We do not mean to suggest that other uses of police force,
including physical restraints or Tasers, do not raise the same concerns.
44
See Del. Code § 9200(c) (9) (proceedings shall be suspended "for a period of time" if an
officer under questioning desires representation "until such time as the officer can obtain the
representative requested if reasonably available"); Ill. Comp. Stat. § 725/3.9 (if an officer under

investigation requests representation, before or during the interrogation, "no interrogation shall
proceed until reasonable time and opportunity are provided the officer to obtain counsel"); Ky. Rev.

Stat. § 15.520(1) (c) ("No police officer shall be subjected to interrogation in a departmental matter
involving alleged misconduct on his or her part, until forty-eight (48) hours have expired from the
time the request for interrogation is made to the accused officer, in writing."); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 40:2531(B) (4) (b) (an officer as target or witness "shall be granted up to thirty days to secure ...
representation, during which time all questioning shall be suspended."); Md. Code, Public Safety
§ 3-104() (2) (i)&(ii) (stating that, if an officer being interrogated desires representation, the
interrogation "shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 10 days until representation is

obtained," which may be further extended by the chief "for good cause"); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 626.89(9) (if any officer giving a formal statement requests representation, before or during an
interrogation, "no formal statement may be taken until a reasonable opportunity is provided for
the officer to obtain the presence of the attorney or the union representative."); Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 289.060(1) (as a general rule, "a law enforcement agency shall, not later than 48 hours before
any interrogation or hearing is held . . . provide a written notice to the peace officer who is the
subject of the investigation" and any "officer who serves as a witness during an interview must be

allowed a reasonable opportunity to arrange for" representation); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-2(9) (if
the officer "under investigation" desires representation, "[t]he interrogation shall be suspended for
a reasonable time until representation can be obtained."); Tx. Local Govt. § 143.123(f) ("Not later
than the 48th hour before the hour on which an investigator begins to interrogate a fire fighter or
police officer regarding an allegation based on a complaint, affidavit, or statement, the
investigator shall give the fire fighter or police officer a copy of the affidavit, complaint, or
statement.").
45 Rules
of the City of New York Title 34-A, Civilian Complaint Review Board,
NEW YORK CITY § 1-24(b), http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/content/section-1-24-conduct-interviews
[https://perma.cc/F8VY-WLCL]. As with state laws, some municipal regulations create procedural
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In other cases, the rules exist within the administrative regulations of
the police department. For example, Boston's department rules allow a
delay, to obtain representation, until 10:00 a.m. the day following
notice of interrogation. 4 6
Local legislative or administrative rules matter even where a
municipality resides in a state with a LEOBR statute because the local
rule can supplement the statute. For example, the Illinois statute only
says that the investigators must provide the target officer a "reasonable
time" to obtain representation. 4 7 In Chicago, by contrast, the
superintendent of police has issued a "general order" that defines this
delay privilege. For investigations by the Independent Police Review
Authority (IPRA) into police shootings in particular: "The shooting
member(s) will be required to give their statement .

.

. no earlier than

48

24 hours after the shooting incident." Because the interviews are to
occur between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., the general order notes that the
delay may be longer than twenty-four hours. 49 Further, the order
provides:
When a shooting member advances a claim that they are unable
to provide a statement within the time period specified .

.

. IPRA

will handle these claims on an individual basis, making a
reasonable inquiry into the reasons for the member's claim, and
accepting at face value all good faith claims of a member's
inability to provide a statement.5 0
This is not, in other words, a scheme likely to elicit timely disclosures
about the use of deadly police force.
Finally, outside of state and local laws or administrative
regulations, there are CBAs. These too exist inside and outside of the
nine states that create delay privileges by statute. Michigan, for
example, has no LEOBR statute, but the CBA between Detroit and the
privileges that do not include investigatory delay. See, e.g., Hurricane, West Virginia, Code of
Ordinances § 133.07(b).
46 This delay rule is the least favorable to police that we have found, creating a limit rather
than a right: "the interrogation may not be postponed for purpose of counsel past 10 a.m. of the
day following the notification of interrogation." See Rule 109: Discipline Procedure, Amended,
BOSTON POLICE DEP'T § 51(i) (Apr. 12, 1983), http://staticl.squarespace.com/static/5086fl9ce
[https://perma.cc/
4bOadl6ffl5598d/t/52af5e69e4bOdbce9d22a6f9/1387224681015/Rule+109.pdf
N55U-QQSN].
4
See Ill. Comp. Stat. § 725/3.9.
4
Chicago Police Department General Order 008-01-01, Department Member's Bill of Rights,
CHI. POLICE DEP'T § 3-C (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.chicagopolice.org/2013MayDirectives/data/
a7a57be2-12cc274e-6a512-cc28-0757e267c9e275a8.html [https://perma.cclP57E-LVFJ].
" Id. at § 3-D.
5o Id. at § 3-H (emphasis added).
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police union provides for forty-eight hours written notice prior to an
interview "except in cases of emergency."5 1 We have found many such
agreements outside the nine states. We are not able to estimate the
number of police covered by each of these regimes. But we are certain
that a substantial number of all American police are entitled to a
specific delay before being interviewed about their use of unlawful force
against civilians. 52 Quite a few other agreements create a presumptive
delay subject to override for some form of necessity, but we do not know
how strong the presumption works in practice. 53 For that matter, even

5'
See Master Agreement Between the City of Detroit and the Detroit Police Officers'
Association, CITY OF DETROIT § 16(J) (3) (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.detroitpoa.com/Uploads/

2014

2019_Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN3S-NNXE].
See, e.g., Agreement by and Between the City of Seattle and Seattle Police Officers' Guild,
DEP'T OF LABOR
§ 3.6(F) (2) (2005), http:I/www.dol.gov/Olms/regs/compliance/cba/olms/
public/810635.pdf [https//perma.cc/85DA-Z39S] (providing that the officer under investigation be
notified of an interview at least five days before it occurs, though the Chief of Police may reduce
this to a one-day notice for "exigent circumstances."); Agreement Between FraternalOrder of Police
52

Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. and Montgomery County Government, DEP'T OF LABOR

§ 43(D)

(1) (b)

(2004),

http://www.dol.gov/Olms/regs/compliance/cba/olms/public/810571.pdf

[https://perma.cc/4Y5H-7D2Y] (providing an officer twenty-four hours to secure representation
before an interview); Agreement Between the City of Omaha, Nebraska and the Omaha Police

Union Local No. 101
§ 18a(c) (2001), http://www.irle.berkeley.edullibrary/pdf/0042.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M2S7-X8AX] (providing an officer with no less than twenty-four hours notice
before the interview, except if the complaint alleges on-duty intoxication or drug use). Some CBAs
are with state-wide unions. See, e.g., Agreement: The State of Florida and International Union of

Police Associations: Law Enforcement Bargaining Unit, DEP'T OF LABOR Art. 7 § 1(c) (2003),
http: //www.dol.gov/Olms/regs/compliance/cbalolms/public/800315.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQ42YDCM] (providing that an officer may upon request have twenty-four hours to obtain and consult
with counsel before an interview); Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State Police

Association of Massachusetts (S.P.A.M.),
DEP'T OF LABOR Art. 27 § 1(8) (Oct. 1999),
http://www.dol.gov/Olms/regs/compliance/cbalpdf/cbrpl161.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48DF-HT2G]
(providing that an officer may delay the interview for the purpose of conferring with counsel until
10:00 a.m. the day following the day the notice is given); Labor Contract Between the State of
Nebraska and the Law Enforcement Bargaining Unit Represented by the State Law Enforcement

Bargaining Council (SLEBC) § 29.7.4.2 (May 18, 2001), http://www.irle.berkeley.edul
Ilibrary/pdf/0365.pdf [https://perma.cc/23Y9-3GG9] (providing an officer the opportunity to review
the case file at least forty-eight hours before an interview).
5

See,

e.g.,

Collective Bargaining Agreement

Between Anchorage Police Department

Employees' Association and Municipality of Anchorage, DEP'T OF LABOR Art. 5 § 1(G) (4) (Dec. 16,
2008), http://www.dol.gov/Olms/regs/compliance/cba/public/6040_pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EMHY2KA] (providing an officer twenty-four hours notice of an interview, unless the Chief of Police
believes notice would jeopardize the investigation); Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween City

of San Diego and San Diego Police Officers Association, DEP'T OF LABOR Art. 41 § 4(A) (July 1,
2003)
http: Iwww.dol.gov/Olms/regs/compliance/cba/olms/public/820238.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
U9WH-WFNE]

(providing that an officer "shall receive at least three days notice prior to an

interrogation except where such delay will hamper the gathering of evidence"); Memorandum of
UnderstandingBetween County of Orange and Orange County Employees Association, 2001-2004,
DEP'T

OF

LABOR

Art. 8

§8(B)

(Oct.

cba/pdf/cbrpl584.pdf [perma.cc/G86P-6FU3

4,

2001),

http:I/www.dol.gov/Olms/regs/compliance/

("All investigatory meetings shall be scheduled to

allow an employee a reasonable opportunity to obtain representation. Whenever practicable, such

notice shall be given at least three (3) working days prior to the meeting."); Michigan, State of and
Michigan State Police Troopers Association, Inc., DEP'T OF LABOR Art. 7 § 5(b) (2003),
http://www.dol.gov/Olms/regs/compliance/cbalolms/public/800411.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XG5H-
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when there is no formal right of delay in any law or CBA, we do not
know that there is not an informal norm of delay.
These legislative, municipal, and negotiated rules, it is important
to note, serve a purpose notwithstanding the fact that the Fifth
Amendment's right against self-incrimination allows officers to resist
interrogation. Correlatively, eliminating these limitations would have a
significant effect even if Fifth Amendment protections continue to
apply. Officers benefit from two rights derived from the Fifth
Amendment. First, they are entitled to the suite of Miranda warnings
required during a custodial interrogation, and can object at a criminal
trial if those warnings are not delivered. 54 We are, however, concerned
here with the full gamut of potential corrective mechanisms, including
internal discipline. Even if criminal prosecution is off the table,5 5
internal investigations remain available as a way of detecting officers
inclined to use excessive force.
Second, in the course of routine administrative proceedings,
officers can be required, under threat of discipline including job-loss, to
answer questions that investigators pose.56 Once statements are
compelled, however, the Court in Garrity v. New Jersey57 held that
neither such evidence nor its fruit can be employed in a criminal
prosecution absent a grant of immunity to the officer.58 Garrity poses a
large hurdle to criminal prosecution, and may be vulnerable to criticism
on that basis. But it does not prevent administrative investigators from
identifying officers who are inclined to use violence, and either
disciplining them, retraining them, or reassigning them. The fact that
criminal prosecution has been impeded, in short, does not also mean
that administrative measures to reduce the expected level of future
unconstitutional force are also unavailable. The Fifth Amendment, in
short, does not render delay privileges nugatory-as the police unions
and officers who lobbied hard for their adoption surely understood.
LQCJ] ("Wherever practicable, the employee shall be given 48 hours advance notice of the
questioning.").
* Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1966).
" There is no bar to using statements obtained in violation of Miranda for internal
investigations. Indeed, there is some authority for the proposition that no Fifth Amendment
violation occurs until a statement is introduced at trial. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 768
(2003) (plurality opinion) ("We fail to see how Martinez was any more 'compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself' than an immunized witness forced to testify on pain of
contempt.").
5
Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (2001).
" 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
68 Id. at 499; see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973) (stating that "Garrity
specifically prohibited [an effort] to compel testimony that had not been immunized."). Garrity
immunity encompasses use and derivative use immunity. See Clymer, supra note 56, at 1319.
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Potential Justifications for Delay Privileges

At first blush, delay privileges present a puzzle: What might justify
the installation of delays between incident and investigation? We
consider here the possible functional explanations for these provisions,
and conclude that none of them has much merit. The absence of
functional underpinnings, though, implicates a further question: If they
have no justification, why do they exist?
Start with a simple fact: To the best of our knowledge, police
officers are never routinely encouraged to delay or suspend the
acquisition of information related to a potential crime in any other
circumstance. To the contrary, the conventional wisdom in law
enforcement is to move promptly to interview witnesses. The truism for
homicide investigations is that the first forty-eight hours are crucial
because the odds of finding a lead fall dramatically after that time, but
the police view timeliness as imperative for all investigations. For
example, 1999 and 2003 guides to the collection and use of eyewitness
evidence prepared by the Department of Justice, under different
Attorneys General, advise: "Plan to conduct the interview as soon as
the witness is physically and emotionally capable." 59 The more recent
guide explains: "Once the witness is capable, any delay in conducting
the interview should be minimized as there will be less detailed
information available as time goes on." 60 The Justice Department also
expresses the concern that witnesses may be exposed to media reports
or other witnesses, either of which might contaminate their
recollections. 6 1 The National Forensic Science Technology Center

'

See, e.g., David L. Carter & Jeremy G. Carter, Effective Police Homicide Investigations:

Evidence from Seven Cities with High Clearance Rates, IND. U.-PURDUE U. INDIANAPOLIS 19

(2015),
https: //scholarworks.iupui.edufbitstream/handle/1805/6160/Carter_2015_effective.pdf?
sequence=1 [https//perma.cc/KV6M-SLHK] ("It is generally recognized that the critical time
interval for identifying suspects, witnesses and evidence is the first 48 hours after a homicide is
reported."); Dominic Casciani, When the Murder Trail Goes Cold, BBC NEWS (May 6, 2010),
http: //news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk -news/magazine/8662635.stm [https://perma.cc/J5KV-BNP9] (quoting
retired detective chief inspector Will O'Reilly as stating: "'Time is of the essence at the beginning
or [sic] any investigation,' he says. 'We talk about a golden hour where there is an opportunity to
make progress-but that can often be pushed further to the first 24 hours and then the first 48."').
" U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER'S MANUAL
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 13 (2003) [hereinafter THE 2003 MANUAL]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OFF. OF
JUST. PROGRAMS, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 21 (1999); see also THE
2003 MANUAL, supra at 21 ("During or as soon as reasonably possible after the interview, the

investigator should ...
[d]ocument the witness's statements ...
and ask the witness if there is
anything he/she wishes to change.") (emphasis added); accord THOMAS F. ADAMS ET AL., POLICE
FIELD OPERATIONS 301 (8th ed. 2014); JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN

AMERICA 134 (2015) (reporting a belief that the "first forty-eight hours" are crucial in a murder
investigation).
6

See THE 2003 MANUAL, supra note 60, at
12.
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similarly advises that "[t]he timely interviewing of witnesses is crucial
to the solution of a crime. Witnesses to crimes must be identified,
secured, [and] questioned at the scene." 62
This common-sense advice is consistent with the science of
eyewitness evidence. A 2003 summary of the empirical literature on
eyewitness testimony identified several elements of investigative
design that could influence accuracy, but did not include the length of
time between an incident and subsequent recollections. 6 3 Laboratory
investigations of strategies to elicit accurate information likewise do
not suggest a need for delay. Instead, they counsel for the use of varied
strings of questions and for approaching the incident from diverse
perspectives, developed with careful attention to the specific
characteristics of the interviewee. 64 In short, neither the general
practice nor the social science of eyewitness testimony justifies delay
privileges.
What then warrants the differential treatment of police? Some
advocates for delay privileges contend that the impact on stress upon
memory retention justifies a delay of up to forty-eight hours after an
incident before engaging in questioning.6 5 The empirical foundations of
this claim have been challenged. 66 We agree with the critics: there is
little or no evidence to support the underlying claim and no rationale
for the differential treatment of police and non-police witnesses.
On the one hand, there is some evidence that stress degrades the
formation of memories among eyewitnesses. 67 This evidence, however,
does not support delay privileges absent evidence that memory
somehow improves over time-i.e., that somehow information initially
not retained in the memory returns over time.68 Further, this evidence

62

(2013),

Crime Scene Investigation:A Guide for Law Enforcement, NAT'L FORENSIC Sl. TECH. CTR. 8
http://www.nist.gov/forensics/upload/Crime-Scene-Investigation.pdf

[https://perma.cc/

8LC9-QRP5].
63 Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277,
285 (2003).
64 R. Edward Geiselman & Ronald P. Fisher, The Cognitive Interview: An Innovative
Technique for Questioning Witnesses of Crime, J. POL. & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 2, 3-4 (1988).
6
See Samuel Walker, Police Union Contract "Waiting Periods"for Misconduct Investigations
Not Supported by Scientific Evidence, 4 (2015), http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/
06/48HourSciencepdf.pdf [https:lperma.cc/ZGQ4-H839].
Id. at 3-4; see also Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Working Toward the Truth in Officer-Involved
6
https://1eb.fbi.gov/2012/
BULL.,
ENFORCEMENT
LAW
FBI
Shootings,
[https: //
may/working-towards-the-trust-in-officer-involved-shootings-memory-stress-and-time
perma.cc/L2QR-Y86P] (suggesting officer recall is better with immediate, rather than delayed,
questioning).
61 See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on
Eyewitness Memory, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 687 (2004).
6
For example, advocates of the police delay privilege have cited Jeffrey M. Ellenbogen et al.,
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does not explain why police officers should be treated differently from
other witnesses. 69 Instead, to the extent that police are more likely than
other suspects to be trained to manage stress, and more likely to have
encountered violent situations before, it would seem that the current
dispensation in which police alone benefit from a delay has matters
backwards.
On the other hand, evidence of a relationship between sleep and
memory formation is "fragmentary."7 0 Some studies suggest that
certain aspects of a memory are recalled better after a period of sleep.7 1
But these studies' implications are equivocal. They show that memory
can either get better or worse depending on the precise nature of the
information. 72 Even if empirical studies gave delay privileges firmer
evidentiary footing, it would still be a puzzle why those most likely to
be trained to attend to detail should benefit from an asymmetrical
timing rule.
Perhaps, however, the explanation for interrogation barriers
generally and delay privileges in particular does not sound in
psychology or law, but in the social role of police. One justification for
interrogation barriers, identified by Keenan and Walker, turned on "the
unique role of the police in American society, a role that includes their
authority to use coercive force, both lethal and non-lethal, and their
capacity to deprive people of their liberty."73 The original demand for

Interfering with Theories of Sleep and Memory: Sleep, Declarative Memory, and Associative
Interference, 16 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1290-94 (2006). The experiments reported provide

some

evidence that, given a twelve-hour delay between learning and memory testing (where the memory
task is made more difficult by "associative interference"), memory is improved by the subject
having slept. But that is not evidence that delay (and sleep) improves memory compared to a
situation of no delay.
69 Walker, supra note 65, at 5.
' Pierre Maquet, The Role of Sleep in Learning and Memory, 294 SCIENCE 1048, 1048 (2001)
(note that this study is about the effect of sleep on memory generally, without regard to stress).
" See generally Bjorn Rasch & Jan Born, About Sleep's Role in Memory, 93 PHYSIOLOGICAL
REV. 681 (2013); Jeffrey M. Ellenbogen, et al., The Role of Sleep in Declarative Memory
Consolidation:Passive, Permissive, Active or None?, 16 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 716

(2006).
72 See, e.g., Jessica D. Payne et al., Sleep Preferentially Enhances Memory
for Emotional
Components of Scenes, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 781, 781-88 (2008) (finding that sleep leads to better
memory of "negative objects," but decaying recall of background details). Further, eyewitnesses
can err not only if they "forget both important and unimportant details" but also "through
commission, incorporating new information that may seemingly sharpen the experience or shape
the narrative for the witness in ways that, even if factually correct, become no longer a veridical
report of that eyewitness's original experience." Nancy K. Steblay, Scientific Advances in
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1090, 1107 (2015). Indeed, one
(somewhat dated) metastudy found that the rates of both positive and false confirmatory
identifications slope upward with time. Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial
Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139, 151 (1986).
7 Keenan & Walker, supra note 36, at 186.
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such bespoke procedural protections was supported by pointing to thenrecent changes in criminal procedure law that (it was argued) had
demoralized officers. 74 Most sympathetically interpreted,7 5 these
original justifications home in upon the distinctively central role of
force in the police role: the frequency of needful force, and the fact that
police must interact disproportionately with a more violent,
disputatious selection of the public, means that police are uniquely
vulnerable to ex post criticism based on the ordinary performance of
their duties. Given their role, and the means typically used to
accomplish it, police are more likely than other state employees to be
subject to false or unreasonable civilian complaints. On this view, the
chilling of police force that results from effectual post hoc investigations
has social costs in terms of officer safety and crime control. Police
accordingly require an extra margin of appreciation to perform their
tasks adequately.
For three reasons, this argument cannot do load-bearing work.
First, the constitutional criminal procedure rules that precipitated
initial calls for additional procedural protections for officers already
reflect a measure of deference to officers.7 6 The remedial avenues
available to subjects of arguably unconstitutional force, including tort
remedies against individual officers and the suppression of evidence
secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment, also typically turn on a
showing that a state actor has not only violated the Constitution, but
also violated an established and especially clear constitutional rule
previously announced by a federal court.7 7 If both the substantive
74 Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the
Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 522-23
(2008) (reporting police unions' arguments that the 'lack of due process rights has led to a loss of
officer confidence in the disciplinary process and a loss of morale").
To be clear, we do not necessarily endorse this sympathetic reading. The shifting
7
procedural landscape of the 1960s and 1970s reflected racial dynamics in ways that may well have
induced negative emotions among police. But even setting aside issues of race, an explanation of
police anxieties about new procedural protections might reflect their anxiety about "relative
position[s]" rather than any actual concern about material consequences. Richard H. McAdams,
Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992). Early sociological accounts of police found that "the
job they shared isolated them from the community and threatened their collective sense of status,"
and motivated the creation of "norms [endorsing] the selective use of illegal violence against
suspects, for example, and [forbidding] officers from testifying against each other." David A.
Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1732 (2005). Legal constraints on the
use of force constitute a material loss of status for police, on this view-and law enforcement bills
of rights were mechanism for clawing back a modicum of this prestige.
76
Hence, the Court often explicitly provides ample breathing room for "officer safety" in the
design of constitutional rules. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1977) (per
curiam).
7
The relevant law is summarized, and critiqued, in Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and
the Rationing of ConstitutionalRemedies, 65 DuKE L.J. 1 (2015) (describing qualifying immunity
in constitutional tort law and the fault rule that has emerged in the exclusionary rule context).
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constitutional law of policing and the remedial apparatus available for
constitutional rights-holders build in large tolerance for officer error,
there is no clear justification for a third layer of protection in the form
of investigatory delay.
Second, measures like delay privileges, unlike the margins of
appreciation already built into constitutional rights and remedies, do
not distinguish between plainly unconstitutional uses of force and other
incidents. Instead, they indiscriminately raise the cost of identifyingand, correlatively, deterring-all wrongful conduct. Even absent other
sources of discretion for front-line officers, institutional mechanisms
that equally protect the vicious and the well intentioned seem unwise.
In addition, delay privileges diminish the availability of information to
police managers about the front-line performance of their officers. 78
Contemporary police forces typically lack institutional mechanisms to
gather information about the distribution and frequency of illegal
force. 79 In short, a measure that restricts the flow of information to
police managers about whether that discretion has been wisely, or
unlawfully, used has large negative externalities.
Finally, we once more find it implausible to conclude that police
officers are more vulnerable, and so more inclined to offer false
inculpatory statements in the course of station-house interrogations,
than the modal criminal suspect.8 0 Although we think this point
relatively self-evident, we find Mirandaa useful lens for thinking about
whether the police-suspect case presents particular difficulties.
Miranda does not distinguish between the sophisticated party attuned
to the law and police practices, and the vulnerable naff possessing only
inchoate awareness of his or her rights, and how best to vindicate them.
One justification for this conclusive presumption of compulsion in
custodial interrogations across sophisticated and naive suspects is a

Note that although most public employees benefit from qualified immunity, it is only police who
benefit from leeway built into constitutional criminal procedure rules and the current exclusionary
rule.
Note that this is not the case for all forms of procedural protections to which officers might

be entitled. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (holding that police "like teachers
and lawyers" are entitled to due process protections in the employment context). Due process
rights provide notice and an opportunity to present one's case expand the information available to
decision-makers, unlike delay privileges.
"

Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law

Enforcement Decisionmahing, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023,

1028-30

(2010)

(finding that law

enforcement agencies rarely gather and analyze information from lawsuits brought against them

and their officers).
0 Relatedly, we think it is unlikely that police officers require more time to identify a lawyer
than the modal suspect. To the contrary, we suspect that police unions shrink search costs on this
score. Cf Harmon, supra note 35, at 799-801 (noting that police unions fund appeals from
discipline determinations).
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persistent epistemic asymmetry of information between both kinds of
suspects and the police: However knowledgeable a suspect, he or she
"needs to know whether the police are prepared to respect [his or her]
rights."8 1 But if there is a discrete subset of suspects for whom this
particular informational asymmetry is less likely to arise, it is members
of the police. The latter are more likely to know whether officers in a
given police force are likely to be rule-followers or are likely to "lose
their tempers" in ways that lead to discomfort, pain, or abuse. 82 The
justifications for prophylactic measures in the interrogation context, in
short, are weaker when the suspect is a member of the police than in
other instances. So if there is a justification for delay privileges from
intimidation or coercion-based concerns, it suggests the current
dispensation is exactly backward.
Because we are lawyers, we cannot resist making a point about the
law here. More specifically, constitutional doctrine, just like common
sense intuition, lists against delay privileges. Two elements of
constitutional criminal procedure in effect subsidize expeditious inquiry
while penalizing delays in interrogation. First, the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause ordinarily bars the use of testimonial statements
uttered outside the trial and without the opportunity for crossexamination.8 3 When police respond to "an ongoing emergency" by
eliciting information, however, that information can be used at trial.8
In the Court's recent treatment of scene-of-the-crime investigations,
Michigan v. Bryant,85 Detroit police investigating a shooting found the
victim lying in a gas-station parking lot.86 By asking him "what

happened," they elicited information about where the shooting had
happened and the identity of the perpetrator.8 7 The Court declined to
treat the statements as testimonial, and therefore covered by the Sixth
Amendment, on the basis of an "[o]bjectiv[e]" assessment of "the
primary purpose of the interrogation by examining the statements and
actions of all participants."" With Bryant in pocket, police have an

But cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 447-48
(1987) ("Even the sophisticated law professor or professional investigator, if he found himself
suspected of crime, would be under considerable pressure to cooperate with the police, to try to get
them on his side by telling what he knew or what he thought he could safely disclose, rather than
standing confidently on his right to remain silent.").
82
Id. at 447.
83
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
'
See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 376 (2011).
562 U.S. 344 (2011).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 349-50, 374-75
Id. at 370.
8'
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incentive to exploit the 'exigent' character of a situation for epistemic
gain, safe in the knowledge that the Court's objective standard
precludes inquiry into their felt intentions.
Second, the Fifth Amendment's right against compelled confessions
requires a set of four warnings before custodial interrogation of a
suspect.89 The Miranda warnings are perceived as a burden by law
enforcement, who have developed strategies for avoiding them or
minimizing their effect.90 Most relevant here, the Miranda regime is
more likely to apply after a prolonged sequence of police-suspect
interactions than at the inception of an encounter. In the first few
moments when police confront a suspect, they can often (if not always)
elicit information without prefatory warnings for use at trial or for later
interrogations. For example, in Oregon v. Elstad,91 police sought out a
teenage suspect in his parents' home to arrest him pursuant to a
warrant. 92 Before executing the warrant, one officer engaged in
conversation that elicited inculpatory information that was used in a
subsequent
interrogation
immediately
preceded
by
Miranda
warnings. 93 A divided Supreme Court held that information from the
second interrogation could be introduced at trial.94 Quite apart from its
treatment of the second interrogation, Elstad reflects the fact that
interactions with police in the moments after an encounter begins will
often rank as noncustodial, such that Miranda does not apply. 95 In
addition, even when a suspect has been arrested, and therefore is
unquestionably in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes, the Miranda
regime is suspended in the teeth of exigency such as imminent risk to
public safety from a nearby concealed weapon. 96 We think that many
drug-related arrests will implicate a risk of proximate concealed

8
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
301 (1980) (defining interrogation as "any words or actions . . that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect").
90
See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2008)

(explaining that "police training has undermined the effectiveness of a system of warnings and
waivers").
91

470 U.S. 298 (1985).

Id. at 301.
Id. at 301-02.
94
Id. at 309. A different result obtains, however, if police deliberately use an unwarned
interrogation in violation of Miranda in a second, warned interrogation. See Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600, 611 (2004) (plurality opinion).
9 Hence, Miranda does not apply where a suspect is stopped for a traffic offense and ordered
out of his or her vehicle. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-40 (1984). Nor does it apply
when a suspect voluntarily accompanies an officer. See generally California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121 (1983).
96 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
9

*
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weapons, such that some questioning at the scene of a seizure can
proceed absent Mirandawarnings.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, in short, operate as a "tax" in
delay in interrogations.9 7 Like any tax, the resulting rules have
behavioral effects on the regulated parties. They elicit a shift from later
to earlier modes of interrogation. To be sure, this (perhaps inadvertent)
element of pre-trial criminal procedure may be inadvisable. The
Supreme Court may be the final word on constitutional criminal
procedure, but finality is not the same as wisdom. The law's inclination
nevertheless raises question about the function of bespoke delay
privileges for police suspects that press in the other temporal direction.
However much we see police and their political allies resisting it, there
is no evidence that police want the Miranda regime inverted such that
it applies to early but not later interrogations on the ground that the
latter are more desirable or trustworthy.9 8 Indeed, we have not been
able to locate any criticism of current doctrine on the ground that its
temporal logic is perverse or undesirable. The absence of criticism or
concern about the law's tax on early interrogations is yet one more
reason to doubt that delay privileges are intrinsically desirable.
In summary, we are skeptical that any functional justifications for
delay privileges exist in general, and are further skeptical that the
rule's observed tailoring to police suspects alone can be justified on
policy terms. This is not to say that the rule lacks tangible effects.
Instead, it is to the likely consequences that we now turn.
C.

The Consequences of Delay Privileges

The central consequence of delay privileges, as we already
intimated, is to raise the costs of investigating potential police
misconduct, including illegal or unconstitutional uses of force that are
our focus here. This frictional effect on effectual investigation arises
from two elements of the policy.
interviews
investigative
before
delays
mandatory
First,
disproportionately benefit officers who need time to prepare for an
interview. All else being equal, we think that officers who committed no
wrongdoing are less in need of time to compose a convincing narrative
of an event for the simple reason that they do not necessarily need one.

" William J. Stuntz, The Distributionof Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1265, 1274-75 (1999).
98 To the contrary, several of the coping or circumvention measures identified by Weisselberg,
involve "softening up" a suspect before custodial interrogation begins. Weisselberg, supra note 90,
at 1555-56. This suggests police still view the period immediately following an arrest and prior to
"custody" as significant and useful.
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In contrast, officers who violated a constitutional or legal rule benefit
from the delay not only by developing their own plausible story, but
also by coordinating with other officers. 99 That is, interrogation buffers
directly enable norms of investigative non-cooperation among officers.
It is true that delay may not be necessary in some instances
because intra-police norms against inculpation of fellow officers are
already powerful. But in the many instances in which officers have to
coordinate a story, they must identify a single story to tell. There is an
academic urban legend that nicely illustrates our point. Four
undergraduates fail to show up for an exam. They later tell the
professor they had a flat tire on the way back from a weekend trip. The
professor appears to accept the excuse and allows the four students to
take a make-up exam, though in separate rooms. They are surprised to
discover that one of the questions on the exam is: "which tire?"100 If the
students were telling the truth, they would offer the same highly
salient answer. But, in a group, a lie requires coordination of the
details of the false account. 10 1
To return to one of the cases discussed in our introduction, it would
hardly have availed Officer Tensing if his colleagues had claimed that
Mr. Dubose had pulled a firearm, or threatened his life, as opposed to
dragging him with his vehicle. 102 This fact is perfectly typical for the
kinds of details that matter in these kinds of cases: Did the suspect
throw a punch or display a weapon? Was the displayed weapon a knife
or a gun? Was it in his right hand or his left? Or was he disobeying
orders and suspiciously reaching for something, in which case, did he
move his hand towards the glove compartment of his car or under his
seat? Successful testilying and its station-house kindred depend on the
kind of collective coordination that requires time to invent,
communicate, and agree on a narrative. Without the communication
enabled by delay privileges, such coordination may be impossible or
substantially more difficult. 103

" See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 14 ("[T]he CBAs make it easy for officers to lie if
they are so inclined-they can wait 24 hours before providing a statement after a shooting,
allowing them to confer with other officers, and they can amend statements after viewing video or
audio evidence.").
' See Tire Sum Excuse, SNOPES (1995), http:lwww.snopes.com/college/exam/flattire.asp
[https://perma.cc/93YV-LM93].
un The Chicago Task Force assembled in the wake of the McDonald shooting noted the same
problem. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 71 ("Critics contend that the waiting period
provides officers time to protect themselves by agreeing on a false story they will all tell when they
have their official interviews with investigators.").
102 See supra Introduction.
'a' One of us has explored in detail elsewhere the relationship between communication and
the aligned expectations necessary for collective action. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point
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The need for coordination does not end there. Those who lie about
violent encounters must also worry about consistency between those
accounts and the physical evidence. It will not work for officers to
construct and recount the same narrative if that narrative is flatly
contradicted by powerful external evidence, such as a video. If you have
seen the video, you choose a better lie, one that turns on movements
and events just outside the camera coverage. 104 More generally, one can
better invent a plausible narrative if one already knows what facts the
other side can prove. The importance of contradictory physical evidence
is one reason that police seek to interrogate criminal subjects quickly,
to lock in their story before they or their lawyers can ascertain what
facts a prosecutor can prove.1 05 Yet the privilege of delay gives police
time to determine some of the fixed facts around which any false
narrative must be adapted.
We do not mean to suggest that every officer is immediately willing
to coordinate on a fabrication. To the contrary, we included two
introductory anecdotes concerning police whistleblowers, Detective
Crystal and whoever alerted journalists to the existence of a dashboard
video showing the killing of Laquan McDonald. The fact that there are
principled and public-minded police officers, however, is part of the
problem with investigatory delay: The latter facilitates the coercion of
these officers. A misbehaving officer who engages in excessive force
might find that a principled officer witnessing his or her conduct is, at
first, willing to break the code of silence and be a whistleblower (or in
the term internal to some police culture, a "rat"). If the investigation
proceeds quickly enough, there would be no time for the misbehaving
officer to influence the witness. Such an officer/witness might also find
a rationalization for telling the truth despite the code of silence:
without knowing what other officers would say, or what the physical
evidence would show, they face personal risks from telling a lie that
would be exposed and, by being uncoordinated, such a lie would not
help the misbehaving officer. Here, delay offers the misbehaving officer
the time not only to circulate a false narrative, but also to bring
pressure on those who seem reluctant to go along, to remind them of

Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658 (2000) ("What can produce the aligned
expectations? One possibility is communication.").
104
The CBA in effect in Chicago contains a provision that prevents officers from being charged
with making a false statement on the basis of testimony that is contradicted by video or audio
evidence unless the officer has had both a chance to review the recording before giving testimony
and a chance to amend their statement subsequently. Task Force Report, supra note 12, at 72.
We agree with the Task Force's conclusion that this rule "does not seem to serve any valid
purpose." Id.
105 See supra text accompanying note 62.
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the consequences of contradicting the false narrative. And having
received the official false narrative, the potential whistleblower no
longer has the excuse for telling the truth that any lie will be detected.
Furthermore, there is a dynamic effect from delay privileges that
reduces the likelihood that unconstitutional or unlawful force will be
revealed or sanctioned. Although the magnitude of this effect is likely
to be smaller than the above causal mechanisms, it is nonetheless
worth explicating. Internal investigations are an important source of
information for police management about the rate and distribution of
problematic force. Delay privileges suppress that information even
within the police department. Absent strong leadership from police
management, it is likely that the signal of low rates of problematic
police force will be treated as evidence that police comply with relevant
limits on the use of force. This undermines the case for allocating
investigative and institutional resources to such problems. Over time, a
feedback mechanism may arise, wherein a weak signal of unlawful
force incidence conduces to weaker investigations, which in turn
generate even weaker signals of underlying force-related misconduct,
and so on.1 06
This dynamic effect may be compounded by a further mechanism:
Internal investigations tending to deny wrongdoing may hinder,
discourage, or raise the costs of tort lawsuits filed against either
individual officers, which tend to be indemnified by the relevant
municipality,10 7 or suits filed against the municipality itself. 108 If this
occurs, it is not just that a municipality economizes on scarce resources
for maintaining public order by shrinking its investments in internal
accountability mechanisms. It also minimizes exposure to future tort
settlements.1 09 In practice, police departments already "limit rather

&

10 There is no research that directly addresses this relationship. One empirical study of
patterns of police misconduct, however, identified the increasing size of a department, along with
the presence of an internal affairs unit, as predictors of higher rates of misconduct. David Eitle et
al., The Effect of Organizationaland Environmental Factors on Police Misconduct, 17 POLICE Q.
103, 113 (2014).
107 Study after study finds pervasive indemnification of individual officers. See, e.g., Lant B.
Davis et al., Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810-12 (1979) (reporting
government defense and indemnification of police officers in Connecticut); Theodore Eisenberg
Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686
(1987); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014).
108
We discuss such liability extensively in Part II.B.
10. And even if this effect is small at the margin, it means at the very least that municipalities
have no intrinsic reason to scale up internal investigations absent external pressure. For
suggestive anecdotal evidence of the pressure faced by municipal attorneys to suppress tort
liability, consider the case of City of Chicago attorney Jordan Marsh, who allegedly lied about
evidence in a tort action brought by the family of a police-shooting victim. Sarah Kaplan, Judge:
Emanuel Administration Lawyer Withheld Evidence About a Fatal Police Shooting in Chicago,
WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/01/05/
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than promote information availability," failing to create or publicize
information that is necessary for sensible regulation of policing. 110 As
Rachel Harmon persuasively argues, "significant counter-incentives"
often lead police management to "underinvest in research that could
improve policy" because a department would not internalize the gains
from such a policy.' Where information might make the police worse
off, even while making society better off, there is all the more ground
for anticipating underinvestment in data collection and analysis. In
short, there is every reason to believe delay privileges not only reduce
the rate of successful identification of unlawful or unconstitutional
police force when first introduced, but also catalyze a feedback
mechanism in which a diminishing proportion of such incidents are
identified on a year-by-year basis.
Something of this sort is, indeed, probably the intended effect of
delay privileges. According to Keenan and Walker, interrogation
buffers for police officers-of which delay privileges are but one
element-date back to the early 1970s, and were a consequence of
rejuvenated police unions' mobilization at both federal and local
levels. 112 As of 2007, thirty-eight percent of local police departments,
which employ sixty-six percent of all officers, were unionized. 113 From
their inception, police unions have protested what they perceive as a
"lack of internal civil and constitutional rights for officers being
investigated for misfeasance and malfeasance." 11 4 That effect must be
understood in light of the two documented effects that unionization has
upon police practices. First, it tends to result in policy changes that
increase the scope of rank-and-file officers to use deadly force and
authorized weaponry. 115 Second, unionized officers also "tend to make a

&

judge-emanuel-administration-lawyer-intentionally-withheld-evidence-in-case-about-a-fatalshooting-by-chicago-police/ [https/perma.cc/2J9J-3V-FDI.
10
Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQUETTE L. REV. 1119,
1129 (2013).
.. Id. at 1131.
112
Keenan & Walker, supra note 36, at 196-97; see also Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police
Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important Areas of American Policing, 9 POLICE PRACTICE
RES. 95 (2008) (discussing police unions).
" Brian A. Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2007, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 13 (Dec. 2010),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdfllpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BWS-XL37]. Only Arizona, Georgia,
North Carolina, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia prohibit collective bargaining. See Seth
W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2207 (2014).
114
HERVEY JURIS & PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM 20-21 (1973). Thirty-four states
require government employers to engage in collective bargaining with public-sector employees,
and another nine states permit it. Richard B. Freeman & Eunice S. Han, The War Against Public
Sector Collective Bargainingin the US, 54 J. INDUS. REL. 386 (2012).
n1 J. M. Magenau & R.G. Hunt, Police Unions and the Police Role, 49 HUMAN REL. 1315,
1330-31 (1996); J. M. Magenau & R.G. Hunt, Sociopolitical Networks for Police Role-Making, 42
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high number of discretionary arrests and to encourage the civilians
with whom they interact to invoke the formal criminal justice process
rather than take advantage of informal, or formal but non-criminal,
alternatives." 1 16 Although the causal mechanisms behind these effects
are not well understood,1 17 their net effect is clear: unionization is
associated with both more frequent contacts between police and
citizenry, and also a higher likelihood of force during such contacts.
From the rank-and-file's perspective, procedural protections may
be tightly related to these changes on the ground. In effect, greater
procedural protections operate to lower the expected cost of a preferred,
high-intensity style of policing. They are a kind of insurance against
the inevitable conflicts and complaints that emerge from that preferred
policing style. To be sure, like many other forms of insurance that pool
together heterogeneous individuals, procedural protections for police
are of greater value to those with higher expected future costs. Here,
the disproportionate beneficiaries are members of a police department
most disposed to use violence at the legal border. But such a crosssubsidy, which seems to us implicit in many union-derived procedural
protections, might be deemed acceptable for a majority of rank-and-file
given risk-averse preferences and a predicable stream of complaints
perceived as false or unfounded.1 1 8 Moreover, from a public choice
perspective, 119 delay privileges may be an especially attractive benefit
for police. Unlike wage increases, which are highly visible and which
sap municipal budgets, procedural protections are a way for a
concentrated, well-organized interest group such as the police to extract
a subsidy from a diffused and poorly organized public without
attracting public scrutiny and hence political opposition.120
In conclusion, the most likely consequence of delay privilegesindeed, perhaps their only likely effect-is to raise the cost across-theHUMAN REL. 547 (1989).
"6 Stoughton, supra note 113, at 2211.
117

Id.

"1 Also, there are many other contexts in which a profession's high self-regard occludes their
perception of "bad apples." Consider priests' or investment bankers' responses to recent scandals

in their ranks.
"' See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1502-03
(2013) (summarizing public-choice theory of legislative production).
"0 The asymmetry in transaction costs is accentuated here because those harmed by delay
privileges are unknown at the time the latter are negotiated. Hence, potential victims have no way
of organizing at the necessary moment. Accord Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59,

71 (2009) ("Prices are also difficult for consumers to identify where costs depend in part on future
events."). For the argument that those attracted to policing would feel rewarded by the power to
impose extra-legal harm on those they believe to deserve punishment, see Richard H. McAdams et
al., The Law of Police, 82 U. CHI. LAW REV. 135 (2015); Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Punitive
Police?Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and CriminalProcedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (2016).
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board of investigations into police uses of force. This immediately
makes unlawful force harder to identify. Over time, they obscure the
incidence of such force, while corroding accountability mechanisms. We
discern no justification for these effects, even given the real hazard of
baseless or malicious civilian complaints. Unlike rational responses to
the latter problem, delay privileges critically fail to sort between
justified and unjustified concerns. With magnificent indifference, they
protect the vicious and the good-hearted alike.
III. LITIGATING DELAY PRIVILEGES: STATE AND
FEDERAL OPTIONS

The interest-group politics of delay privileges means they are
unlikely to dissipate without exogenous intervention. As the powerful
backlash to the "Black Lives Matter" movement suggests, 121 efforts to
regulate the police trigger considerable political and popular
resistance. 122 We therefore turn in this Part to legal strategies under
current state and federal law that might be used to chip away at the
practice. At the threshold, we underscore that the legal theories
explored in this part provide no miraculous remedy. As Samuel Walker
has noted, "reforms [have] generally failed to develop mechanisms to
ensure their own continuity." 1 2 3 Litigation in particular does not
necessarily elicit learning by police departments. 124 Nevertheless,
where an interest group has entrenched a regressive and harmful rule
that democratic processes alone are unlikely to dislodge, litigation can
influence police behavior on the ground, 125 draw attention to a rule
among the public, illuminate the weak justifications for the rule, and
render the rule impossible to defend. In that chastened spirit, we offer
121
See Editorial, The Truth of 'Black Lives Matter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.
[https://perma.cc/UX49nytimes.com/2015/09/04/opinion/the-truth-of-black-lives-matter.html
9PB6].
122
This resistance will include the unions responsible for pressing for delay privileges in the
first instance. See Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, in Police Reform from the Bottom Up:
Officers and Their Unions as Agents of Change, in 149 POLICE REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP:
OFFICERS AND THEIR UNIONS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE (Monique Marks & David Sklansky eds.,
Routledge 2012).
123
Samuel Walker, InstitutionalizingPolice Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making
Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57, 59 (2012).
124
Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (2012).
121
Carol A. Archibold & Edward R. Maguire, Studying Civil Suits Against the Police: A
SerendipitousFinding of Sample Selection Bias, 5 POL. Q. 222, 228 (2002) (summarizing previous
empirical litigation showing some police sensitivity to the prospect of lawsuits). On the other hand,
a survey of police chiefs in Texas found that two-thirds believed that "the possibility of lawsuits
only mildly affected or had no effect at all on their departments." Michael S. Vaughn et al.,
Assessing Legal Liabilities in Law Enforcement: Police Chiefs' Views, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 6-7
(2001).
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two pathways for challenging delay privileges in courts under state and
federal law.

Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A.

Section 1983 of Title 42 provides a federal tort remedy against
state actors who violate the Constitution or federal law. Enacted in
1871,126 § 1983 was functionally a dead letter until the Supreme Court's
1961 ruling in Monroe v. Pape,127 which rejected a definition of the
statute limited to acts condoned by state law. 128 Monroe, however,
construed § 1983 not to extend to municipalities. The Court overruled
that holding in its 1978 decision Monell v. New York Department of
Social Services of New York. 129 Importantly, municipal liability suits
differ from individual liability suits not only because relief is limited to
compensatory damages, 130 but also because qualified immunity is
unavailable. 131
Monell emphatically rejected vicarious liability theories of
municipal liability. 132 Instead, a § 1983 plaintiff seeking compensation
must show that (1) "some official policy," (2) .'cause[d]' an employee to
violate another's constitutional rights." 133 Much litigation has ensued
over precisely what counts as a "policy," and which species of city
officials have authority to promulgate one. 134 However, a theory of
municipal liability trained on delay privileges need not expend much

126
Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000)). In relevant part, the provision states: "Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ...

subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person ...
to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured . . . ."
12
365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York,
436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
8 Id. at 172 (rejecting the description of state action offered in Barney v. City of New York,
193 U.S. 430 (1904)) (abrogated by Estate of Conner by Conner v. Ambrose, 990 F. Supp. 606
(1997)).
2 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
13o
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 265-67 (1981).
121
Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1980). One of us has argued
elsewhere that certain elements of municipal liability doctrine echo qualified immunity. See Huq,
supra note 77, at 25-26.
132 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. Monell also stated that a city could be liable
based on a custom
among its employees. Id.; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1970) (emphasizing

the difference between a custom among state employees and a custom among the general polity).

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (holding that "the
identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law"); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) ("With this understanding, it is plain that municipal liability may be
imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.").
1n
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effort on this question. It is likely that in most cases, the official
agreeing to the CBA has the requisite authority to create a "policy" for
§ 1983 purposes, and that he or she has done so by entering into such
an agreement when it regiments the workplace. This requirement of
municipal policy-making-which will easily be met in the suits we
envisage-means that the theory of liability outlined here will not avail
when a delay privilege is adopted as a matter of state law. In such
cases, no municipal policy-maker exists to be held liable.
A challenge to a municipality's delay privilege pursuant to § 1983
would proceed along the following lines. The plaintiff would be a person
who had been subjected to unconstitutional police force. This plaintiff
would file suit not just against the officer in question but also against
the municipality asserting violations of the Fourth Amendment. 135 A
central factual claim in the complaint would be that the defendant
officer had previously employed unconstitutional or illegal force in
incidents that had been investigated using a delay privilege under a
CBA, and that those incidents had resulted in no disciplinary action,
training, or other species of course-correction by senior officers. The
incidence of such fact-patterns, of course, is an empirical question. Not
every incident of allegedly unconstitutional police force will meet these
characteristics. But we think that it is likely that a nontrivial number
of cases will track this pattern given the evidence that the illegal force
incidents tend to be highly concentrated among a few individuals
within a police force. 136 This is the conclusion, for example, of our
colleague Craig Futterman's analysis of historical police misconduct
allegation data from the Chicago Police Department. 137 It was also the
case in the McDonald shooting.
Given clear evidence of a policy, an unconstitutional act that
resulted in compensable harm, the central question under this theory of
municipal liability will be one of causation. The Court's municipal
liability jurisprudence underscores plaintiffs' need to present clear

"' Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (establishing a totality of the circumstances
test for Fourth Amendment challenges to police force); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386
(1989) (same). This standard has been persuasively criticized as "indeterminate and
undertheorized." Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119,
1120 (2008).
136
See, e.g., Ben Brumfield, Before Tackling James Blake, Police Officer Had Complaints of
Brutality, CNN (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/14/us/james-blake-tackled-officer/
[https://perma.cc/PK32-E8AN]; see also Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence:
Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B. U. L. REV. 17, 67 (2000)
(recounting other cases in which officers using unconstitutional force had histories of such
conduct).
131

Personal communication of authors with Prof. Craig Futterman.
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evidence that a policy was the "moving force" behind the violation. 138
For example, in cases alleging municipal liability based on improper
training or supervision, liability is established only by showing a
constitutional deficiency was "so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely
to result in the violation of constitutional rights" that policymakers
could be said to be "deliberately indifferent." 1 39 In cases alleging a
failure to adequately screen employees, the Court explained that
liability attached only "where adequate scrutiny of the applicant's
background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the
plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would
be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right." 140 In one
recent case, the Court overturned a jury verdict that a district attorney
should have perceived a need for additional training based on repeated
failures to disclose exculpatory material because it was not "so
predictable that failing to train the prosecutors amounted to conscious
disregard for defendants' Brady rights." 141 In short, a plaintiff must
demonstrate to a high degree of certainty that continued deployment of
an officer would have had results of the kind that in fact occurred.
We think that this standard can be satisfied in a challenge to a
delay privilege. The argument would go as follows. As we set forth in
Part II.B, the only justification for, and the only expected consequence
of, such policies is to raise the cost of investigating police misconduct
across-the-board. The predictable effect of such policies is to occlude
culpability in an instant case, while also eroding over time the
informational basis for managers to make informed decisions about
how to train, equip, and sanction their officers. Because these dynamics
further the fiscal interests of a department by reducing exposure to tort
suits, the long-term effect will be systematic failures of sound
management and predictable patterns of iterative illegal force by
repeat offenders.
The theory of causation in these circumstances would parallel the
causal mechanism proved up in cases concerning municipal failures to
l
Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 401 (1997); id.
at 415 ("Where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation,
municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability.").
139 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); see also City of
St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124-27 (1988) (establishing a narrow definition of official policymakers
for § 1983 purposes).
140

Brown, 520 U.S. at 411.

1'
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011) (emphasis in original) (citing Brown, 520 U.S.
at 409); Huq, supra note 77, at 26 (criticizing the logic of Connick). Earlier cases took the plausible
view that "[c]ircumstances can alter cases," such that a historical pattern of violations can alert
policy-makers to the actual effects of a policy sufficiently to establish Monell liability. Pena v.
Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J).
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investigate or discipline. For example, in a 1992 case involving
allegations of false arrest and sexual assault by an officer, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the North Little Rock, Arkansas,
police department had "implemented a policy of avoiding, ignoring, and
covering up complaints of physical and sexual abuse." 142 Systematic
failures of investigation by civilian complaint review boards have also
generated liability. 143 Some years before the Eighth Circuit decision,
the Second Circuit held that a failure to investigate prior complaints
can evince deliberate indifference sufficient to establish causation for
Monell purposes. 144 In a sense, these cases rest on the same theory of
liability as decisions in which police are found liable for abandoning
suspects in high-crime areas, who are subsequently harmed by third
parties. 145 Both kinds of cases concern a decision taken by an official
tortfeasor, where the harm that is likely to arise is, in a sense, inflicted
by a third-party. In neither line of cases does the fact that a third party
(either the officer or a criminal) intervenes to harm the plaintiff break
the causal chain.
A recent case involving allegations of unconstitutional force by
Denver, Colorado, police, provides a useful example of how causation
would be demonstrated in a case involving delay privileges. 146 In Ortega
v. City and County of Denver,147 four plaintiffs alleged the
unconstitutional use of force against them by police officers. 148 Among
their theories of liability, the plaintiffs alleged that the City of Denver
had "failed to discipline officers for the use of excessive force" in the
past. 149 Based on plaintiffs' evidence that "Denver had a 'systematic
problem' of officers not being held accountable for their uses of force,"
and a finding that the individual defendant officers had previously been
the object of insufficiently investigated complaints, the district court
rejected the City's motion for summary judgment on that claim. 150 Of
Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1992).
Cox v. District of Columbia, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Hogan v. Franco, 896 F.
Supp. 1313, 1316 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
144
Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, N.Y, 783 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that
"indifference was demonstrated by the failure of the City defendants to exercise reasonable care in
investigating claims of police brutality"); see also Hazel Glenn Beh, Municipal Liability for Failure
to Investigate Citizen Complaints Against Police, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209 (1998) (discussing
those cases).
See Michael S. Vaughn, Police Civil Liability for Abandonment in High Crime Areas and
14
Other High Risk Situations, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 407 (1994) (summarizing relevant case law).
146
Ortega v. City and Cnty of Denver, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Colo. 2013).
147
944 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Colo. 2013).
142
143

14
149

Id. at 1036.

Id. at 1039.

"' Id. at 1039-40 (internal citation omitted).
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relevance here, the district court also accepted a separate claim that
15 1
"Denver has a custom of tolerating its police officers' 'code of silence."'
Under the plaintiffs' theory of the case, the failure to discipline and the
code of silence allegations provided complementary causal mechanisms:
both counted as "policies" for Monell purposes. It seems likely that in
many cases, as in Ortega, there will be multiple causal pathways
linking a municipality to an alleged tort in this fashion. It is possible to
imagine a federal court analyzing each of those strands separately, and
concluding that each strand failed to satisfy the "moving force"
threshold for causation identified by the Supreme Court if treated in
isolation. This kind of pixelated approach analysis, which the Ortega
Court eschewed, is implausible. If there are several elements of city
policy that cause a constitutional tort, and the city is responsible for
adopting each one, there is no clear reason why the city should be able
to escape responsibility for its deliberate choice to combine those
policies by insisting on a seriatim analysis of causation.
At the same time, we do not mean to suggest that all relevant
precedent counsels in favor of liability. Other decisions concerning
failure to discipline allegations, in contrast, have been dismissed on the
ground that "the failure of a police department to discipline in a specific
instance .

.

. [is rarely] an adequate basis for municipal liability under

Monell." 152 It is possible, though, that a plaintiff could successfully
distinguish the latter decisions on the ground that they were based on a
failure to show the causal effect of a policy, a showing that could be
made in challenges to delay privileges.
In summary, the theory of municipal liability for delay privileges
falls into a legible, long-established strand of municipal liability
jurisprudence. We cannot be certain the theory will prevail in any given
case. Nevertheless, we think that such litigation, given the right factual
record and a judge not disposed against § 1983 litigation, could prevail,
and thereby influence municipal practice.
B.

State Law
1.

A Contractual Provision Void as Against Public Policy

We also offer an alternative litigation strategy for state courtsone seeking to invalidate the investigatory delay provisions in police
CBAs, although not state or local law (challenges to state or local law

Ortega, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1040-41 (internal citation omitted).
Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 777 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing
Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1056 (10th Cir. 1993)).
'
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will depend on. the federal constitutional claims just described). The
National Labor Relations Act does not apply to CBAs involving public
employees. 153 CBA provisions are therefore subject to state law,
including state contract law (as modified by the state's labor law). As
contracts, there is a plausible argument that a right to delay
investigation is contrary to public policy and therefore void. 154 The
doctrine of void-as-against-public-policy is old and established in state
contract law. The starting point, of course, is that contracts are void if
part of the promised performance is illegal, as in a contract to murder,
but the doctrine stretches far beyond simple illegality and has been
applied in a wide variety of settings.15 5
One of the most pervasive examples of contractual invalidity across
different jurisdictions, based on public policy, involves judicial creation
of a whistleblower exception to the default rule of at-will
employment. 156 In many states with at-will employment, the courts
have nonetheless created for employees a contractual right not to be
fired for revealing the employer's legal violations-i.e., whistleblowing.
The basic idea is that public policy favors detection of law violations,
including the statutory, administrative, or common law violations the
employer commits. In many states, the public policy doctrine requires a
clear and explicit statement of policy from the legislature. But it is not
difficult for courts to find this in the statutes whose violation is the
subject of whistleblowing. If the state has a statute prohibiting bribery
of public officials or the dumping of toxic waste, then there is a public
policy to detect bribery and dumping that is impeded by recognizing the
employer's contractual right to fire employees reporting such behavior.
As

one

court explained,

"[i]t

is

public

policy .

.

. everywhere

to

encourage the disclosure of criminal activity."1 5 7 In general, then, a
contractual provision that allows employees to be fired for the public

'
See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (defining the term "employer" under the National Labor Relations Act
to exclude "the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof.").
154
See, e.g., 51 C.J.S. LABOR RELATIONS § 328 (2016) ("As with contracts generally, a
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy is unenforceable."); Am. Fed'n of
State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep't of Cent. Management Services, 173 Ill.2d
299, 307 (Ill. 1996) ("As with any contract, a court will not enforce a collective-bargaining
agreement that is repugnant to established norms of public policy."). Regarding the public policy
doctrine generally, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (1981).
155

See, e.g., 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON AND RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

CONTRACTS § 12:2 (4th ed. 1990) ("[A]t least some courts are not the least bit reluctant to rely on
public policy in declaring bargains they perceive to be inappropriate invalid per se.").
See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of Whistleblower
156
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000).
15' Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 853 (10th Cir. 1972).
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service of disclosing legal violations is contrary to public policy and

void.
The same public policy condemns investigatory delay provisions.
The police officer willing to testify to another officer's use of excessive
force is a potential whistleblower. For reasons given above,
investigatory delay suppresses whistleblowing of this variety. First,
delay gives misbehaving officers time to pressure the potential
whistleblower, by describing past retaliations against officers who
break the code of silence and "rat" on fellow officers and by promising to
harass the current witness in a similar way in the future should he
expose them. Second, the time to coordinate on an official false
narrative deprives the potential whistleblower of the excuse that he
had for implicating a fellow officer by telling the truth-that before
there was a coordinated false narrative, he had no other way to avoid
being caught in a lie than to tell the truth. Finally, if the potential
whistleblower expects multiple other witnesses to swear to the false
narrative, he or she may rationally decide that it is pointless to tell the
truth when one won't be believed anyway (or not sufficiently to cause
the officer to be disciplined). The public policy of detecting crime is
inconsistent with a collective bargaining provision that has no other
substantial
purpose
but to
conceal
wrongdoing
and
deter
whistleblowing.
Obviously, the argument we are making requires an extension of
existing precedent. In the cases we are discussing, the municipal:
employer does not threaten to fire or discipline the whistleblower for
telling the truth, but merely engages in a time-limited omission-the
temporary failure to interview police witnesses. Yet this is a conceptual
distinction without a policy difference. From the law of constructive
discharge, when an employer knowingly tolerates sufficient co-worker
harassment to cause resignation, it is tantamount to a dismissal.1 58
Scholarship on policing amply shows that police officers enforce the
code of silence with social ostracism, refusals to answer calls for backup, denials of promotion, reassignments to less desirable postings, and
threats of violence. When such harassment forces an officer to resign,
the resignation should be understood as constructive discharge that
itself violates whistleblowers protections. 15 9 Yet the well-known reality

1"
See, e.g., Smith v. Delaware State University, 47 A.3d 472, 477 (Del. 2012) ("We hold that
an employee who is constructively discharged can pursue a claim under the Whistleblower Act, on
the same basis as if she had been formally discharged."); Univ. of Texas Medical Branch at
Galveston v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Tex. App. 1999) (same).
"9 See, e.g., Ballinger v. Delaware River Port Auth., 172 N.J. 586, 606-07 (N.J. 2002) (firing
police officer for reporting suspected criminal behavior outside the chain of command violates
public policy).
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is that it remains difficult or impossible to prove constructive discharge
in any individual case, given the code of silence. If the problem is
largely intractable, the least the court should do is not to make it worse
by tolerating a contractual provision that makes the constructive
discharge of whistleblowers easier (by giving the misbehaving officers
time to coordinate on a false narrative and to communicate threats of
harassment to potential whistleblowers), thus deterring whistleblowers
from coming forward. The protection of police whistleblowers demands
that the municipality retain the power of immediate investigation of
police wrongdoing, including the prompt interview or interrogation of
police suspects or witnesses. Contractual provisions to the contrary are
void as against public policy.160
As an analogy, consider that a municipality could not lawfully
promise in a CBA with a police union not to discipline any officer for
any use of excessive force against citizens. Such a provision would not
only be against public policy; it would shock the conscience. When
police force is excessive, it is beyond the bounds of a criminal defense
and therefore constitutes a crime, either assault or homicide. As a
matter of expressed policy, every American government aims to
discourage violent crime. It would deeply compromise this policy for an
employer to promise not to discipline an employee for violent crimes
committed in the course of employment. For that reason, we think that
such a contract provision would be void regardless of the employer's
identity. This does not mean the employer is legally obligated to
discipline the employee; rather, the employee could not enforce a
promise not to discipline him or her for a violent crime committed in
the course of employment. But a no-discipline-for-crime provision would
be even more adverse to public policy if the employer is a government
that cloaks employees with legal authority and empowers them to use
physical force against others. The public policy against violent crime
demands that governments retain the discretion to discipline or fire
those individuals who abuse their official power by committing violent
crime in the course of their public duties.
If governments are not permitted to forego entirely the power to
discipline or fire officers using excessive force, they should also not be
permitted to forego the power substantially but indirectly by
hamstringing their own disciplinary investigations. A promise of
investigatory delay is obviously not exactly the same as a promise not
to discipline for the simple reason that, ultimately, some officers may
Cf. Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that a contractual provision by
1"a
which association partly funded by the state government waives its rights to attorney fees in civil
rights litigation against the state is void).
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be disciplined given the former, but not the latter. But the imperfect
protection of investigatory delay should not detract from the analogy. A
police union could not hope to negotiate an overt shield from discipline
given the political reality. But they can hope to achieve a substantial
amount of disciplinary immunity though an obscure privilege of
investigatory delay, a seemingly innocuous detail within a group of
more defensible interrogation buffers. A contractual provision that
significantly strengthens the code of silence and impedes the
disciplining of officers who engage in excessive force is void as against
public policy.161

We have found no case directly on point, but there are cases in
parallel settings that provide support for this reasoning. In Illinois
State Police v. Fraternal Order of Police Troopers Lodge No. 41,162 two
state troopers arbitrated separate complaints that an internal-affairs
officer had interviewed them without the benefit of the interrogation
buffers provided by the LEOBR provisions of their CBA, such as
twenty-four hour notice of "the nature of the complaint and pertinent
facts alleged" and the right to have counsel present. 163 Internal affairs
replied that the interrogations were for purposes of a standard criminal
investigation (concerning insurance fraud and sexual abuse) and not
investigations concerning job-related discipline. The arbitrator
nonetheless ruled in the state troopers' favor. This ruling suggests that
police officers not only benefit from procedural rights for disciplinary
investigations related to on-the-job misconduct, but also, by virtue of a
CBA, are entitled to special rules for all interrogations by fellow
troopers. These include advance notice of the alleged facts and the
presence of counsel for all criminal wrongdoing, even entirely unrelated
to official duties. For example, an officer alleged to have committed
spousal abuse would benefit from the CBA's protection even in the
course of a domestic violence investigation of purely private conduct.
Given that defense counsel invariably advise clients to refuse to talk to
police, the arbitrator's construction of the CBA could be understood to
confer on troopers a blanket freedom from criminal interrogation by
their own police force.

161 Cf. Jones v. Chevalier, 579 So.2d 1217 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (void to contract
to warn a
person of police investigation).
1'
751 N.E.2d 1261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); see also City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers
Ass'n, Local 854, 263 A.D.2d 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Prince George's County, MD. ex rel. Prince
George's County Police Dep't v. Prince George's County Police Civilian Employees Ass'n., 98 A.3d
1094 (Md. Ct. of Special Appeals 2014). But see City of Highland Park v. Teamster Local Union,
828 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
" 751 N.E.2d at 1263.
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The Appellate Court of Illinois vacated the arbitrator's award on
two grounds. First, it held that the CBA by its terms simply did not
apply to criminal interrogations, but only to interrogations directed at
employment discipline. 164 The second reason-more relevant here-was
that impeding a criminal investigation in this manner was void as
against public policy. 165 The Appellate Court reached this conclusion

even though there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial
enforcement of arbitral decisions. 166 Given this presumption, it is quite
possible for a court to find a contractual provision void against public
policy, but then to defer nonetheless to an arbitral decision enforcing
the provision. But the Appellate Court in Illinois State Police was not
willing to defer in this fashion. Instead, it held that there was an
"established," "basic," and "unquestionabl[e]" public policy in favor of
effective law enforcement. 167 Further, the court ruled that interrogation
buffers "contravene[" the internal affairs division's "ability to
investigate crimes." 168 The division "presented the undisputed
testimony that the element of surprise is very important in conducting
criminal interrogation." 16 9 The court concluded that the arbitrator's
award violated the public policy of effective law enforcement.
Of course, Illinois is one of the states that incorporates a delay
privilege into state statutory law, so one cannot credibly claim that
CBAs instantiating such rights violate the state's public policy. Indeed,
the defendants in Illinois State Police offered various state statutes of
this sort in support of the arbiter's award and the court distinguished
them solely on the ground that the investigation at issue was criminal,
not civil. Yet in forty-one states, delay privileges are not embodied in
state law. In those jurisdictions, one can ask courts to give the
reasoning of Illinois State Police its full logical scope. If interrogation
buffers impede the investigation of criminal wrongs for the purpose of
criminal prosecution, they also necessarily impede the investigation of
criminal wrongs for the purpose of job discipline (excessive police force
being a crime-assault or homicide). Even if one stubbornly resisted
this logical implication for some interrogation buffers, the logic is

Id. at 1265-66.
16

Id. at 1266-67.

See United Paperworkers v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987). Nonetheless, there are some
exceptional cases that have held CBA provisions upheld by an arbitrator to be void as against
public policy. See Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep't of Cent.
Management Services, 173 Ill.2d 299 (Ill. 1996).
"' 751 N.E.2d at 1266 (citing Palmateer v. Intl Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880
(Ill. 1981)).
16

Id. at 1267.

169

Id. (emphasis added).
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overwhelming when applied to delay privileges. Regardless of why
police crime is investigated-to impose job-related discipline or
criminal sanctions-the investigator's success depends on proceeding
expeditiously, moving before their official narrative takes hold, and
retaining "the element of surprise." A CBA provision delaying the
investigation is void.
2.

Standing to Bring Public Policy Arguments Against CBAs

Ordinarily, the only actors with standing to raise the invalidity of a
contractual provision are the parties to the contract. The city or state
that entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a police union
clearly has standing to challenge the provision, should it be motivated
to disregard the delay privilege and promptly interview police officers
involved in police misconduct, as targets or witnesses. The invalidity
would be a defense to any effort to enforce the contractual limit.
We realize, though, that a city or state that signs an agreement
containing that provision may have no incentive to challenge it. That
presents a serious obstacle to reform. The standing barrier is a matter
of state law, so we are only generalizing when we say that citizens,
even those with claims against police, will lack standing to challenge
the contract on the grounds we set out. It is worth investigating in any
particular jurisdiction.
There is, however, frequently an alternative. The state attorney
general would plausibly have parens patrie standing to represent the
public's interest in asserting the invalidity of police contract provisions
that violate public policy. The Third Circuit allowed such standing in
Pennsylvania u. Porter170 when the state attorney general sued a police
officer and members of the city council for violating state law by
infringing the constitutional rights of state citizens. The attorney
general argued that the police officer had engaged in a pattern or
practice of misconduct by mistreating, threatening, harassing, and
illegally detaining and arresting citizens in the municipality of Millvale
with the acquiescence and ratification of the Mayor and Council.17 1
Under settled doctrine, a state has standing to sue "only when its
sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not
merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens." 172
The Court held that the state attorney general could bring an action
against a municipality and its officers because it had "significant

"o
171

"

659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 310.
Id. at 329 (citing Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976)).
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sovereign interests of its own in the prevention of future violations of

constitutional rights of its citizens." 173
Similarly, in New York v. Town of Wallkill, 174 the court permitted
New York's attorney general to bring a parens patriae claim against a
town for knowingly allowing its police to target and stop women and
critics of the department in violation of federal and state law.17 5 The
court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent made it difficult for
plaintiffs seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against law
enforcement officers, 176 and that many victims were deterred from
reporting police conduct due to fear of retribution.1 7 7 Because of the
futility of private rights of action against law enforcement, the court
concluded that a parenspatriaeaction "is the best and, likely, the only,
method for obtaining the sort of systemic, forward-looking relief that
the State here seeks."17 8 The court applied Pennsylvania v. Porter's
holding that states are entitled to parens patriae standing when "vital"
interests, such as "the prevention of a pattern of police lawlessness,
under official sanction," are at stake.17 9 By the same reasoning, a state
attorney general should have standing to challenge a provision in a
police collective bargaining agreement that systematically protects
officers guilty of the use of excessive force.
IV. CONCLUSION

We do not think that delay privileges are the most important
problem on the police reform agenda at present. Far from it. But we do
think that their reform is, in a sense, an example of low-hanging fruit.
They provide an especially attractive target for actors outside the police
interested in seeking reform. In contrast to highly visible, often
textually memorialized delay privileges, many police practices that are
causally related to higher incidence rates of unlawful police force are
hard to discern from outside the institutional bounds of a department.
Training, for example, may be inadequate or even invoke antiquated,
stereotypical ways of framing criminality. Criteria for hiring may select
173

Id. at 316.

17

No. 01-Civ-0364, 2001 US Dist. LEXIS 13364 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001).

'7

See generally id.

See Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 10-06 (1983)) ("A plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely
on past injury to satisfy the [Art. III] injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she
will be injured in the future.").
"' See New York v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-Civ-0362, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13364, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001).
`8
Id. at *21.
17
Id. at *10.
176
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officers least likely to take care in using force. And rules regulating
promotions may select on the basis of, and then create, incentives for
less careful husbanding of coercive authority. In each of these cases, the
relevant police practice may not be visible from outside the police
department. By contrast, delay privileges are highly visible, and their
impact on rates of unlawful force is likely to be both significant and
consequential. Their challenge and ouster, we emphasize, is the
beginning and not the end of police reform. Much remains to be done to
understand
and change the institutional
circumstances
of
constitutional violations. The reform of delay privileges should not be
an excuse for failing to release more data about coercive practices,
hiring and promotion criteria, disciplinary mechanisms, and complaint
rates-or for remaining inert when new forms of transparency reveal
further causal mechanisms sustaining current rates of unlawful force.
Nevertheless, our modest aim in this Article has been to identify one
immediate platform for reform that need not await disclosures by police
force. We hope, therefore, that delay privileges are challenged in
litigation that brings both public attention and financial penalties to a
practice that lacks substantial normative justification, and that has
only regressive and unjust effects.

